A new social contract is formed after the social contract is broken in the prediction market.

• History circulates, but content is of a higher order
• interchange format
• The extremity of interchange format C destroys once and for all the protection that interchange format B provided.
• So a new social contract needs to be signed.
  • (Maybe it goes through the new exchange style A once before it gets to the new exchange style B.)

context

• digital democracy
  • There are two Yusuke Narita-like and Audrey Tan-like.
  • Is Audrey Tan-like viable?
• prediction market - Smooth transition between human and AI governance
• Ideal market to be able to buy and act on
• Shares held by the minister are not disclosed.
  • No obligation to disclose personal financial assets
• Can't the BOJ take a position in the first place?
  • What if we could have it?
• Assassination and Forecast Markets
  • Assassination makes the world go round.
  • Bet that person X will be assassinated by the time limit.
    • If you pile funds on the side that is not being done, you can provide an unspecified number of people with an incentive to assassinate you.
    • You can request an assassination for a contingency fee by anonymously taking a position in the prediction market and the assassin anonymously taking a counter position without having to "ask the hit man."
    • Anonymity is maintained for both parties.
• I thought celebrities were usually killed.
  • You can reduce the incentive to kill by taking the position of the person being killed yourself.
  • To kill or not to kill is determined by a vote of confidence with money as the vote.
  • Politicians without money get killed.
  • Fans take the position of the one whose guess is killed so that their guess is not killed.
• After all, politicians are usually killed.
  • There is a type of player who prefers to have fluctuations, irrespective of ideology.
    • But it's a bit of an economic rationale, because people who prefer to have fluctuations have to bet on the absence of fluctuations in order to cause fluctuations, so it's a bit of an economic rationale.
    • I think it's more likely that activists with strong political ideas and money will "kill the box" rather than "box" the opposing politician.
• This situation creates a strong negative incentive to be a politician.
• That's where a new mechanism is needed.
  • Just as our taxpayers' money deters murder by hiring the police to come and get you when you murder, so does the deterrent effect of murder.
  • Transaction fees will need to create incentives to deter assassination.
• This can only occur once the assassination deterrent is destroyed.
  • Once destroyed, only those who can defend themselves militarily can become politicians, and then the trend is to introduce a new deterrence system because they don't want to be assassinated.
  • →A new social contract is formed after the social contract is broken in the prediction market.

This page is auto-translated from /nishio/予測市場で社会契約が壊れた後で新しい社会契約が結ばれる using DeepL. If you looks something interesting but the auto-translated English is not good enough to understand it, feel free to let me know at @nishio_en. I'm very happy to spread my thought to non-Japanese readers.